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Abstract
This paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules
characterized by diﬀering degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become
special cases of what we call quasi commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed
to formulate optimal commitment plans, to be tempted to renege on them, and to succumb
to this temptation with a constant exogenous probability known to the private sector. By
interpreting this probability as a continuous measure of the (lack of) credibility of the monetary
policy authority, we investigate the welfare eﬀect of a marginal increase in credibility. Our
main ﬁnding is that, in a simple model of the monetary transmission mechanism, most of
the gains from commitment accrue at relatively low levels of credibility. In our benchmark
calibration, a commitment expected to last for only 6 quarters is enough to bridge 75% of
the welfare gap between discretion and commitment. This seems to justify the well known
concern of monetary policy makers about their credibility, even in a world with limited access
to commitment technologies.
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Ph: (212) 720-5657. Fax: (212) 720-1844. Email: Andrea.Tambalotti@ny.frb.org“... the key point here is that neither of the two modes of central bank behavior -
rule-like or discretionary - has as yet been ﬁrmly established as empirically relevant or
theoretically appropriate. (...) This position does not deny that central banks are con-
stantly faced with the temptation to adopt the discretionary policy action for the cur-
rent period; it just denies that succumbing to this temptation is inevitable.”(McCallum,
1999 pg.1489-1490.)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
As ﬁrst pointed out by Kydland and Prescott (1977), “economic planning is not a game against
nature but, rather, a game against rational economic agents.” When agents are rational and
forward looking, economic planners face constraints that depend on their current and future
choices, as forecasted by the private sector. Optimal policy therefore needs to internalize the
eﬀect of those choices on current private behavior.1
Consider for example the case of a central bank confronting a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and
the level of real activity.2 In this environment, the credible announcement of a future policy
tightening, in excess of that needed to curb forecasted inﬂationary pressures, lowers inﬂation ex-
pectations, thereby contributing to an easing of the current trade-oﬀ. Optimal policy will then
exhaust the net marginal beneﬁt of this announcement. On the other hand, following the recursive
logic of dynamic programming, discretionary policy will treat private expectations as given, thus
foregoing the gains from future announcements. This results in decisions that, although subop-
timal, are time-consistent. Optimal policy however, as far as it involves non-veriﬁable promises
about future behavior, is not time-consistent. The contractionary policy that was optimal when
the plan was formulated, due to its moderating eﬀect on inﬂation expectations, ceases to be op-
timal as soon as those expectations have crystallized. This creates an obvious tension between
the optimality of the commitment plan and the ex post incentive to abandon it. Central banks
can enjoy the beneﬁts of commitment only if the private sector knows (with probability one) that
they will not deviate from their initial plan. But in the absence of a commitment technology,
there is no reason for the private sector to believe that this deviation will not happen ex post.
This tension is exacerbated by the binary nature of the choice faced by the public. It can either
believe the central bank, or not.
In this paper, we propose a way of endowing private agents with the beneﬁt of the doubt. We
assume that a new central banker is appointed with a constant and exogenous probability α every
period. When a new central banker comes into oﬃce (in period τj), she reneges on the promises
1 To our knowledge, Fischer (1980) was the ﬁrst to stress that time inconsistency of the optimal policy is a
consequence of forward looking behavior, rather than of rational expectations per se.
2 After the seminal contributions of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978), applications of the theory of
economic planning with rational agents to monetary policy have attracted by far the most attention in the literature.
Following this tradition, we illustrate most of our points within a monetary model. As it will be clear from section
2 though, our theory of policy making under limited commitment has a much wider range of applications.
2of her predecessor and commits to a new policy plan that is optimal as of period τj. Agents
understand the possibility and the nature of this change and form expectations accordingly. The
private sector will then be constantly doubtful about the reliability of outstanding promises on
future policy. In this economy, policymakers have access only to a limited commitment technology,
which we refer to as quasi commitment. Individual central bankers can guarantee their own
promises but cannot inﬂuence the behavior of their successors, who are therefore expected to
formulate their own policy plan. Given this expectation, it is optimal for a new central banker to
reoptimize.
Note that, even if reoptimizations can be arbitrarily frequent, under quasi commitment there
is no room “to exploit temporarily given inﬂationary expectations for brief output gains.” (Mc-
Callum, 1999, pg. 1487). Since policy cannot deviate systematically from the behavior anticipated
by the private sector, commitment is the global optimum of the planning problem, but it can only
be sustained by a technology that guarantees policy announcements with probability one. By
placing restrictions on the menu of credible promises available to the planner, quasi commitment
then results in suboptimal outcomes. This allows us in turn to rank a continuum of intermediate
cases between commitment and discretion and to investigate to what extent access to imperfect
commitment technologies might still approximate the optimal equilibrium.
It is worth stressing here that the main source of the central bankers’ temptation to abandon
the existing policy plan is not the celebrated average inﬂation bias of Barro and Gordon (1983). As
further clariﬁed in section 2, we model a monetary authority whose objective is compatible with
the underlying steady state of the economy, and that does not attempt to achieve “overambitious”
output gains (Svensson, 2001). Nevertheless, as stressed for example by Clarida et al. (1999) and
Woodford (1999), the forward looking nature of agents’ expectations makes it optimal for the
planner to promise future policies that she would rather abandon ex post. Note that this requires
incoming policymakers to contemplate policy from a τj-optimal perspective. In fact, under this
approach to policy, expectations formed in period τj −1 are taken as given and at τj a new policy
is formulated that is not necessarily consistent with those expectations. Yet, quasi commitment
remains a systematic approach to policy because the public anticipates this to happen with the
correct frequency, so that in equilibrium expectations are not exploited on average. Note also
that, if at time τj policy were reconsidered from a timeless perspective, quasi commitment would
collapse to the optimal stationary policy for any value of the parameter α.3
Quasi commitment is a useful modeling device to escape the strict binary logic of the debate
on “commitment vs. discretion”, and to connect those two extreme modes of policy making into
a continuum of policy rules. We ﬁnd it particularly suggestive though to interpret α as a measure
of the credibility of the central bank, that is of “the extent to which beliefs about the current
and future course of economic policy are consistent with the program originally announced by
policymakers,” (Blackburn and Christensen, 1989 pg. 2). In an environment in which the available
commitment technology suﬀers the limitations described above, the public always contemplates
the possibility that the current policy plan be abandoned. The higher the probability attributed to
3 See Svensson and Woodford (1999) for the concepts of t0-optimal and timelessly optimal policy.
3this event, the higher the mismatch between the public’s perceptions and the program announced
by the policymaker, the lower her credibility.4 Credibility then becomes a continuous variable,
measuring the probability that a central bank matches deeds to words, according to the deﬁnition
advocated by Blinder (1998).
Our deﬁnition of credibility is quite distinct from the ones previously proposed in the literature.
In particular, we do not interpret credibility in terms of the relative weight on output in the central
bank’s loss function (Rogoﬀ, 1985), or in terms of the discrepancy between inﬂation expectations
and the central bank’s inﬂation rate target (Faust and Svensson, 2000), but rather in terms of the
expected durability of policy commitments. In this sense then, our notion of credibility is closely
related to the empirical measure of actual central bank independence proposed by Cukierman
(1992), the observed turnover rate of central bank governors.5 Moreover, assuming that private
agents are perfectly informed about the nature and objectives of monetary policy, we rule out
reputational equilibria based on the public’s uncertainty about the preferences of diﬀerent types
of central bankers (see for example Barro, 1986 and Rogoﬀ, 1989).
We also view our approach to credibility as an alternative to the one built on the game theoretic
apparatus of Abreu, Pierce and Stacchetti (1986, 1990).6 Diﬀerently from that literature, we are
not interested here in exploring the set of competitive equilibria that can be sustained by punishing
governments that renege on their promises. This issue is bypassed by simply assuming that
policymakers have access to a commitment technology that guarantees (some of) their promises. In
our model, credibility is not the attribute of a particular policy plan–the plan which policymakers
optimally choose not to deviate from when behaving sequentially–but rather of a central bank
as perceived by the public. In the reputation literature, policy plans are either sustainable or
not, mainly as a function of how harsh a punishment the private sector is able to inﬂict on a
deviating policymaker. Optimal policy will therefore never imply a deviation from announced
plans (Phelan, 2001). Under quasi commitment on the contrary, diﬀerent central banks enjoy
diﬀerent levels of credibility, depending on the commitment technology available to them, so that
deviations from pre-announced plans are indeed observed in equilibrium, even if they do not
generate any systematic surprise for the public. In this sense then, quasi commitment can be
thought of as assuming, rather than explaining, policy credibility. Nevertheless, we do not regard
this as a major shortcoming of the model, since our focus is on the consequences of marginal
increases in credibility, rather than on its premises. As Calvo pricing is widely regarded as a
useful starting point to explore the consequences of sticky prices, even if its time dependent
microfoundations are only suggestive of actual pricing behavior, so we propose quasi commitment
as a modeling device to explore intermediate decision making procedures between discretion and
4 Credibility and α, the instantaneous probability of a reoptimization, are inversely related. We ﬁnd it convenient
to adopt α
−1, the average length of the period between successive reoptimizations, as a direct measure of credibility.
We will sometimes refer to the period between successive reoptimizations as “a regime”.
5 Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) show that central bankers’ turnover rates are correlated with the level
and variability of inﬂation in cross country regressions.
6 The seminal papers are Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Stokey (1989, 1991). See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000,
Chapter 16) for an introduction and Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) for a prominent recent example.
4commitment, along a dimension that can be usefully interpreted as reﬂecting diﬀering degrees of
credibility.
The papers in the literature that are closest to ours are Flood and Isard (1988) and Roberds
(1987).7 Flood and Isard (1988) identify conditions under which commitment to a simple rule
can be improved upon by the addition of a provision for discretionary optimization in the face
of “big” shocks.8 Our framework can easily be adapted to interpret α as the probability of an
extreme draw of the exogenous i.i.d. shocks that buﬀet the economy. Under this interpretation,
policymakers are given free reign in the face of “big” shocks, but diﬀerently from Flood and Isard
(1988), this optimally results in a new commitment rather than in a reversion to discretion.
Roberds (1987) presents a technical apparatus very similar to the one described below. She
solves a model in which policy is set by a sequence of policymaking administrations whose turnover
is determined by i.i.d. Bernoulli draws. Thanks in part to the better understanding of optimal
policy problems available today, our solution method is more transparent and more widely applica-
ble than Roberds’, accommodating systems that include non-trivial dynamics for the endogenous
state variables and singularities in the contemporaneous relations. Moreover, we prove the ap-
plicability of standard linear quadratic techniques to the stochastic replanning problem, which
was only assumed to hold in Roberds (1987). We also provide analytical expressions for the value
of each administration’s problem as a function of the parameter α, and for the impulse response
functions of the endogenous variables to the exogenous shocks. On the other hand, we do not treat
here the case of asymmetric information between policymakers and the public, that gives rise to
an interesting class of equilibria with delayed information (see Roberds, 1987 Section 4). Finally,
and much more importantly in our view, we provide a novel interpretation of the frequency of
administration turnover as a measure of the credibility of policy in the eyes of the public. This in
turn allows us to exploit the technical apparatus ﬁrst presented by Roberds (1987), and further
developed here, to address important questions in the still open debate on “rules vs. discretion.”
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally introduces the notion
of quasi commitment and outlines our proposed solution method for ﬁnding quasi commitment
equilibria. The discussion is cast in terms of a general linear-quadratic economy with rational,
forward looking expectations, with most technical details relegated to an appendix. In Section
3 this methodology is applied to a simple New Keynesian model of the monetary transmission
mechanism. We ﬁrst solve the model analytically, to gain some intuition into the key steps involved
in ﬁnding a quasi commitment equilibrium. We then proceed to illustrate the dynamic behavior
of the economy in a calibrated version of the model, under diﬀerent assumptions on the degree of
credibility enjoyed by its monetary authority. Finally, we study the distribution of the gains from
commitment and the extent to which a limited commitment technology can still approximate the
7 Fischer (1980, pg. 105) could be interpreted as foreshadowing quasi commitment. However, his conjecture
that “a randomized policy that is rationally expected may do better than non-stochastic optimal open loop policy”
(i.e. full commitment) does not hold true in our framework. Kara (2002) proposes an empirical study of quasi
commitment.
8 Flood and Isard (1988) consider a commitment to a simple non contingent rule, which, even if credible, does
not provide any insulation against shocks. That is why adding an escape clause can improve its performance.
5optimal outcome. Section 4 concludes.
2 An Analysis of Quasi Commitment
This section describes a general analytical framework for the study of a continuum of policy rules
indexed by a credibility parameter α ∈ [0;1].9 Two common assumptions about policymakers’
credibility, discretion (no credibility) and commitment (perfect credibility), are nested in this
framework as limiting cases of what we call quasi commitment. Several popular models of policy
making with forward looking agents fall into the class of models treated here, including for example
models of monetary policy and taxation. While much of the discussion in the remainder of the
paper focuses on the leading example of monetary policy, this section avoids reference to any
speciﬁc economic context in order to highlight the general nature of the approach.
2.1 The Economic Environment
Consider a situation in which a sequence of policymakers with tenures of random duration seek
to maximize a shared policy objective. Each policymaker can commit to a contingent plan for the
duration of her tenure, but cannot make credible promises regarding the actions of her successors.
At the beginning of every period the acting policymaker receives a publicly observable signal
ηt ∈ {0,1}.I f{ηt =1 }, the incumbent is replaced at the beginning of period t,a ne v e n tw h i c h
occurs with some ﬁxed probability α known to all agents in the economy. To make things simple,
the sequence of regime change signals {ηt}t≥0 is assumed to be i.i.d. over time and exogenous with
respect to all other randomness in the system.10 When a regime change is signalled (i.e. ηt =1 ),
a new policymaker takes over and formulates a policy plan, eﬀective as of time t.I f n o r e g i m e
change is signalled (i.e. ηt =0 ) the existing policymaker continues to implement the policy she
had committed to at the beginning of her tenure.
The state of the economy is described by a set of predetermined state variables xt buﬀeted
by an i.i.d. exogenous shock process εt. Based on the information set It = {xs,ηs}s≤t and their
knowledge of the parameters of the model, including α, private agents form expectations about
the future resulting in allocations described by the jump variables {Xt}t≥0 , while the policymaker
implements a sequence of policy actions {it}t≥0 according to a state contingent plan committed to
at the beginning of her tenure. Rational private agents correctly take into account the probability
of a regime change when forming expectations about the future, which therefore depend on the
distribution of both types of shocks, {εt,ηt}t≥0.
The starting point of the analysis is a system of linearized equilibrium conditions from a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The system consists of the deviations from a
9 Following Svensson (1999a), we interpret a policy rule in a broad sense, as a “prescribed guide for (...) policy
conduct.”
10 The case where the likelihood of regime changes is state-dependent is in general much more complicated. One
notable exception, which can easily be incorporated in our framework, is to let {ηt} depend on the realization of
the i.i.d. shocks hitting the system. In this case, reoptimizations could be interpreted as reactions to “big” shocks,
as in Flood and Isard (1988).
6deterministic steady state of nx predetermined variables xt and nX non-predetermined variables
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for a given sequence {it}t≥0, where it is a q-dimensional vector of policy instruments. As usual,
autocorrelated shocks are included in xt, so that the structural shocks {εt}t≥0 can be assumed to be
i.i.d. with covariance matrix Ω. The matrices Ω ∈ Rnx×nx,A∈ R(nx+nX)×(nx+nX),G∈ RnX×nX
and B ∈ R(nx+nX)×q contain structural parameters speciﬁc to the steady state, which are assumed
to be known to all agents.






















for some positive semideﬁnite symmetric matrix W. Even though it is not always possible to
derive (2) from ﬁrst principles as a welfare criterion, in such cases we will simply assume that the
policymaker wishes to stabilize the economy around its structural steady state. In doing so we
conform to the established tradition of adopting quadratic objective functions in policy analysis,
which allows us to compare our results to those found in the literature.
An important feature of the loss function in (2) is that the policymaker has not been endowed
with target levels for the endogenous variables diﬀerent from their respective steady states, thus
eliminating the average bias of the discretionary policy. The reason is that we wish to isolate
the eﬀect of forward looking expectations on the conduct of optimal policy and in particular on
the gains from commitment. The lack of target values also implies that the steady state and the
unconditional expectation of the state variables coincide and remain unchanged across all levels
of credibility, which allows us to gauge the relative ability of policymakers to counteract shocks
to the economy as a function of their credibility.11
The optimal equilibrium that we wish to solve for in the limited commitment setting described
above can be summarized by the following
Deﬁnition 1 (Quasi Commitment Equilibrium) A Quasi-Commitment Equilibrium with cred-
ibility parameter α consists of a sequence {xt,X t,i t}t≥0, such that
i) Agents one-step-ahead expectations Et [Xt+1] are linear in a suitably expanded set of state
variables, which includes xt
ii) The policy plan {it}t≥0 maximizes (2), given (1) and agents’ expectations
11 From a purely analytical perspective, target values can be accomodated by simply augmenting (1) with an
equation for the constant. Under quasi commitment though, the presence of target values would imply diﬀerent
average levels of inﬂation at diﬀerent levels of α, since lower credibility implies a higher average bias.
7iii) The sequence {xt,X t}t≥0 is the unique stable solution of (1), given the optimal policy plan
{it}t≥0 and agents’ expectations
iv) Agents’ expectations are rational, given the equilibrium sequence {it,x t,X t}t≥0 and the prob-
ability of a reoptimization α
Note that there may well exist equilibria in which rational expectations cannot be represented
as linear functions of the state variables. We disregard any such equilibria here, since this would
bring us beyond the linear quadratic regulator framework with which we work in the sequel.
2.2 The Policymaker’s Problem
The problem faced by the policy authority is to minimize the discounted sum of expected period
losses (2), subject to the constraints given by the equilibrium conditions (1). The optimization
problem can then be written as







xt+1 − A11xt − A12Xt − B1it − εt+1 =0 ,x 0 = x
1{ηt+1=0}[GEtXt+1 − A21xt − A22Xt − B2it]=0
where the matrices A,B have been partitioned conformably with (x0
t,X0
t)0.T h i sl o o k sm u c hl i k e
the standard commitment problem (see for example Söderlind, 1999), except for the fact that the
last set of constraints does not bind whenever a regime change {ηt+1 =1 } occurs. This essentially
allows a new policymaker to disregard expectations held in the period prior to her arrival into
oﬃce. As the private sector forms its expectations prior to the realization of the ηt+1 shock, the
policymaker is in eﬀect able to “surprise” agents. The term surprise is however a slight misnomer,
since agents attach positive probability to a regime change as well as to the continuation of the
current regime. In this sense they are equally “surprised” when the regime actually continues for
another period.
For the purpose of characterizing its solution, it is useful to analyze the optimal policy problem
by grouping the losses accruing during each successive regime, rather than period by period. To
this end, deﬁne the dates of regime changes {τj}j≥0 and regime durations beyond the initial
period {∆τj}j≥0 as
τj =m i n {t|t>τ j−1,η t =1 },τ 0 ≡ 0
∆τj = τj+1 − τj − 1
(4)
Thus the jth regime starts at date t = τj and is in eﬀect for t ∈ {τj,...,τj + ∆τj},t h a ti su n t i l
time t = τj+1, at which point the j+1st regime takes eﬀect. With this notation the policymaker’s
objective (3) can be rewritten in terms of a sum of losses over individual policy regimes













xt+1 − A11xt − A12Xt − B1it − εt+1 =0 ,x 0 = x
1{ηt+1=0} (GEtXt+1 − A21xt − A22Xt − B2it)=0
8The recursive structure of the problem is now clear: policymakers face exactly the same type of
problem at the beginning of each regime. In the initial period the expectational constraint is not
binding, although it must be satisﬁed in every period thereafter. Furthermore, since the sequence
of regime durations {∆τj}j≥0 is i.i.d. Geometric(α), the expected duration of each regime is equal
to α−1.
The solution to a problem of this type can be found using a version of the Bellman optimality
principle, which implies that successive central bankers choose to implement the same optimal
plan. Problem (5) can then be interpreted as that of a single policymaker who cares not only about
the losses accruing during her own regime, but also takes into account a terminal payoﬀ given
by the discounted sum of losses pertaining to all subsequent regimes. The associated Bellman
equation is then12















GEτj+kXτj+k+1 − A21xτj+k − A22Xτj+k − B2iτj+k
´io
s.t.
xτj+k+1 − A11xτj+k − A12Xτj+k − B1iτj+k − ετj+k+1 =0
ϕτj =0
In this expression, the state variables xτj are predetermined as of the last period of the j − 1st
regime while the nX predetermined Lagrange multipliers ϕτj+k+1, corresponding to the constraints
involving private agent’s expectations, must satisfy the initial condition ϕτj =0 . T h i si sa
consequence of the reoptimization that accompanies the inception of each regime, whereby the
constraint involving expectations formed in the last period of the previous regime is not binding for
the incoming policymaker. Therefore, the value function V (·) depends on xτj alone, rather than
on the predetermined Lagrange multipliers as well. Note that the “regime-by-regime” formulation
in (6) requires us to evaluate the value function only at points in time {τj}j≥0 when a new regime
begins, instead of period-by-period, when the value function depends explicitly on the evolution
of the Lagrange multipliers. In accordance with the Bellman principle, the value function V (x)
deﬁned in (6) is the minimum achievable value of the objective (2) and the state contingent optimal
policy plan chosen by the jth policymaker will indeed be optimal for all subsequent policymakers
to follow.
The solution method is very similar to solving for the optimal discretionary (i.e. Markov
perfect) equilibrium, since each policymaker reoptimizes without taking into account past com-
mitments. There are, however, a few notable diﬀerences. First, the policymaker is in fact able
to credibly commit to a policy rule, albeit only for a random number of periods. This results in
a running cost function that is random as of time τj. Second, the jth central banker must look
inﬁnitely into the future because her commitment will last an arbitrarily large number of periods
with a positive probability. Through the continuation value, she also internalizes the eﬀect on
her successors of the level of the state variables at the end of her tenure. Finally, within the jth
12See Marcet and Marimon (1999) for a formal treatment of “recursive saddle point” functional equations.
9regime, the state variables consist of the nx predetermined variables {xτj+k}0≤k≤∆τjtogether with
the nX Lagrange multipliers {ϕτj+k}0≤k≤∆τj, rather than of the predetermined variables alone,
as it would be the case under discretion.
2.3 Private Agents’ Expectations and Linear Equilibria
In our environment, private agents must form expectations about the entire inﬁnite future, and
in particular across policy regimes. Therefore they diﬀer signiﬁcantly from policymakers, in that
they must form expectations about the responses of the non-predetermined variables Xt+1 to
t h er e g i m ec h a n g es i g n a lηt ∈ {0,1}, taking into account that every period, with probability α,
a regime change may occur. Since we restrict attention to equilibria with linear dynamics, we
consider a representation of private agents’ rational expectations as linear functions of the state
variables within each regime. Due to the exogeneity of the signals η, agents’ expectations are a
simple weighted average of expectations conditional on the current regime continuing for another
period and of expectations conditional on a regime change. Note that, without the assumed
exogeneity of the regime change signals, agents would have to internalize the eﬀect of their own
expectation formation on the likelihood of a regime change, which would introduce a signiﬁcant
complication in the analysis.
The one-period-ahead expectations formed by agents in period k of the jth regime can then
be written as
Eτj+k[Xτj+k+1]=( 1 −α)Eτj+k[Xτj+k+1|τj+1 >τ j + k +1
| {z }
within regime




using Bayes rule to condition on whether a regime change happens. The ﬁrst expectation is
simply the one-step-ahead expectation of Xτj+k+1, given no regime change between today and













ϕτj+k+1|τj+1 = τj + k +1
i
= HEτj+k[xτj+k+1]
for some H ∈ RnX×nx and ˜ H ∈ RnX×nX. The last equality follows from the fact that, conditional
on {ητj+k+1 =1 },ϕ τj+k+1 = ϕτj+1 =0because of the intervening reoptimization. Furthermore,
t h ef a c tt h a txτj+k+1 is predetermined implies that knowledge of ητj+k+1 does not help to predict
its value, so that the last line in (7) is just conditioned on the information Iτj+k.
2.4 Quasi Commitment Equilibrium
To solve for a quasi commitment equilibrium one must simultaneously solve for the value function
V (·), the optimal central bank plan and agents’ rational expectations, which in turn feed back into
10the central bank’s optimization problem through the matrix H in (7). This suggests an iterative
procedure in which one alternates between solving for the value function and the optimal policy
rule given private agents’ expectations and solving for the expectation representation H consistent
with a given policy rule.
Given the assumed linear-quadratic structure of the problem, we start by guessing a quadratic
form for the value function, which is parametrized as follows
V (x)=x0Px+ ρ, P ∈ Rnx×nx,ρ ≥ 0 (8)
The validity of (8) must then be ex post veriﬁed as part of the solution. For given beliefs H,t h e



















¯ ¯τj+1 >τ j + k +1
¤
+αGHxτj+k+1 − A21xτj+k − A22Xτj+k − B2iτj+k
¢
+2φ0
τj+k+1(xτj+1+k − A11xτj+k − A12Xτj+k − B1iτj+k)
io
where we have introduced the nx non-predetermined Lagrange multipliers φτj+k. Note that the
probability of a regime change has three eﬀects. First, it modiﬁe st h ed i s c o u n tr a t et ot a k ei n t o
account the survival probability of the regime (the probability of the regime lasting at least k+1
periods is (1 − α)k). Similarly, the continuation value is multiplied by α(1 − α)k to account for
the probability of the regime ending at time τj + k +1 . Finally, the expectational constraint is
modiﬁed to take into account that the non-predetermined variables may jump unexpectedly if a
regime change should occur at time τj + k +1 .
To see the connection between quasi commitment, discretion and full commitment, consider
ﬁrst α =1 . In this case only the ﬁrst term in the inﬁnite sum remains. Since a new regime
starts every period with probability one, we have ∀t, ϕt =0and (9) reduces to the familiar
expression for the optimal discretionary policy (see Söderlind, 1999). Next, consider the opposite
extreme, α =0 . In this case, the running cost function is identical to the objective function under
commitment, the terminal value drops out of the sum and the term αGHxτj+k+1 disappears from
the constraint.
It is not possible to solve simultaneously for the value function V , private agents expectations
H, and the optimal policy plan. However, it is not diﬃcult to solve for any one of these quantities
given the other two. This motivates the following two-step iterative solution procedure.
Step 1 For given values of H and of the value function parameters (P,ρ), the policymaker’s
problem can be solved by taking ﬁrst order conditions in (9). The resulting dynamic system yields
the optimal within-regime evolution of the extended vector of variables {xt,ϕ t,i t,X t}, which we



























with ϕτj =0and xτj predetermined as of the last period in the j − 1st regime. The matrices
(M,C,ξ) are in general complicated non-linear functions of agents’ beliefs H and of the value
function parameters (P,ρ).
Step 2 Given the state space form (10) one can substitute back into (7) to get an equation for
H w h i c hm u s tb es a t i s ﬁed in order for expectations to be consistent with the proposed equilibrium
Eτj+k
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Finally, one may solve for the value function parameters (P,ρ) by substituting the state space

















































where the matrices V1,V 2 are given in the appendix as solutions to two Sylvester equations in-
volving the state space parameters {M,C,ξ} alone.
Starting with some initial guess for (H,P,ρ),aﬁxed point for this procedure will result in a
state contingent policy plan it = ξ0¡xt
ϕt
¢
which is optimal from the perspective of the policymaker
and in private expectations which are rational given the nature of the policymaker’s limited
commitment.
3 Quasi Commitment and Monetary Policy
This section applies the methods developed above to a simple New Keynesian model of the
monetary transmission mechanism.13 The model describes an economy populated by a continuum
of competitive, optimizing private agents and by a central bank that tries to maximize (a second
order approximation to) the welfare of the representative consumer. The strategic interaction
13 Woodford (2002) contains an exhaustive treatment of this class of models. See also Clarida et al. (1999) and
Galí (2001).
12between the atomistic private sector and the monetary authority leads to the joint determination
of interest rates, real output and inﬂation. Despite its simplicity, the model contains all the
necessary ingredients for an insightful analysis of the stabilization eﬀort of a central bank faced
with a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and the level of real activity. In particular, the private sector’s
forward looking behavior that naturally emerges from the model’s microfoundations, and that
sets it apart from its traditional Keynesian and “New Classical” predecessors, is at the heart of
the time-inconsistency problem that opens the way to quasi-commitment.
After brieﬂy describing the economic environment, in section (3.2) we derive an analytical
solution to a version of the model with uncorrelated shocks. This helps to clarify the main
steps involved in solving for a linear quasi commitment equilibrium and allows us to characterize
some of its qualitative features. We then proceed to a quantitative investigation of the model’s
dynamic responses to the exogenous shocks and of their dependence on the credibility parameter
α. This naturally leads to the discussion of our main results on the distribution of the gains from
commitment along the credibility dimension, which concludes the section.
3.1 A Simple New Keynesian Model
The demand side of the economy is described by a dynamic IS equation, which is simply a log-
linear version of the Euler equation of the representative consumer
xt = Etxt+1 − σ(it − Etπt+1 − rn
t ) (13)
where xt is the output gap, πt i st h er a t eo fi n ﬂation, it is the nominal interest rate controlled by
the central bank and rn
t is the natural rate of interest, the real interest rate that would prevail
in an equilibrium with ﬂexible prices. The parameter σ>0 is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption.14
The supply behavior of the monopolistically competitive producers in the economy is described
by a forward looking Phillips curve, obtained as a log-linear approximation to the optimal price
setting rule under Calvo pricing
πt = κxt + βEtπt+1 + ut (14)
where β is the subjective discount factor of the representative consumer, κ>0 is a function of
structural parameters and ut is a “cost-push” shock (Clarida et al., 1999). As noted by Woodford
(2003, Chapter 6), this is one of many supply shocks that might buﬀet this economy. It plays a
crucial role here because of its ineﬃcient nature. Driving a ﬂuctuating wedge between the natural
and the eﬃcient level of output, this shock presents the monetary authority with a trade-oﬀ
between output and inﬂation stabilization.
Finally, the period objective function of the monetary authority, derived as a second order




14 More precisely, since it is interpreted here as the annualized value of the quarterly nominal interst rate, the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in quarterly consumption is 4σ.
13with the central bank’s inﬂation and output gap targets both assumed to equal zero. This econ-
omy is thus characterized by the absence of the traditional average inﬂation bias of Barro and
Gordon (1983). The steady state level of output is assumed to be eﬃcient, for example because
a sales subsidy eliminates the distortion associated with monopolistic competition, so that the
central bank will not be tempted to push the economy above potential through surprise inﬂation.
Nevertheless, as illustrated below, the commitment policy continues to deliver a better outcome
than discretion, as it internalizes the beneﬁcial eﬀect of controlling expectations through promises
about future policy behavior.
Note also that in the absence of cost-push shocks, the economy could be perfectly stabilized
around the optimal values of zero inﬂation and output gap. It is only in response to an adverse
shock say, that the central bank ﬁnds it optimal to engineer a recession. Under the optimal
commitment plan, this recession will be protracted beyond what is strictly necessary to counteract
the immediate inﬂationary eﬀects of the shock. It is this extra dose of contraction, optimally
promised at the beginning of the disinﬂation program to rein in inﬂation expectations, that makes
the policy under commitment time inconsistent.
3.2 Equilibrium Fluctuations under Quasi Commitment
Having described the economic environment, we can now turn to the characterization of the
equilibrium under quasi commitment. First, we derive analytical expressions for the equilibrium
sequences of the endogenous variables {xt,πt,i t}
∞
t=τj within a regime, as a function of the credi-
bility parameter α, in an economy with i.i.d. shocks. We then investigate the dynamic behavior
of a calibrated version of the model in response to both independent and autocorrelated ineﬃcient
shocks.
3.2.1 Analytical Characterization
The problem of maximizing the objective (15) under the constraints (13) and (14) can be greatly
simpliﬁed if we note that a perfectly observable rn
t does not pose any particular problem to the
policymaker, who can completely insulate the economy from ﬂuctuations in the natural interest
rate with oﬀsetting movements in the policy instrument it. W ec a nt h e np r o c e e da si fxt were the
actual instrument of policy and the Phillips curve the only constraint for the policymaker, with
the dynamic IS equation left to determine the level of the interest rate necessary to bring about



















1{ηt+1=0} [βEtπt+1 − πt + κxt + ut =0 ]
u0 = u
where, as in equation (5), we have highlighted the losses pertaining to the jth central banker. As
detailed above, the key to the solution of this problem is the correct treatment of expectations.
14The private sector survives its central bankers and therefore needs to systematically contemplate
the possibility of a change in regime. In this simple model, in which the equilibrium inﬂation rate
is assumed to be a linear function of the current cost-push shock, or πτj+k+1 = π∗ + huτj+k+1,
one step ahead expectations are formed as
Eτj+kπτj+k+1 =( 1 − α)Eτj+k
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=( 1 − α)Eτj+k
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πτj+k+1|τj+1 >τ j + k +1
¤
where the second line follows from the independence of ut and the fact that, with no average
inﬂation bias, average inﬂation is zero (i.e. π∗ =0 ) . The Bellman equation associated with the


























πτj+k+1|τj+1 >τ j + k +1
¤
− πτj+k + κxτj+k + uτj+k
¤o
where ϕτj+k+1, the Lagrange multiplier attached to the equation determining inﬂation at time
τj + k, is measurable with respect to the information set Iτj+k. Taking ﬁrst order conditions of
the extremum problem on the right hand side of (16) we obtain, ∀t ∈ {τj,...,τj + ∆τj}
λxxt + κϕt+1 =0 (17a)
πt − ϕt+1 + ϕt =0 (17b)
(1 − α)βEtπt+1 = πt − κxt − ut (17c)
ϕτj =0 (17d)
This system, in which, with a slight abuse of notation, we have suppressed the proper con-
ditioning in the one-step-ahead expectation in (17c), describes the evolution of the endogenous
variables within the jth regime. Focusing our attention on equation (17a), we see that in the last
period of the regime, tL = τj + ∆τj, the output gap can be written as xtL = − κ
λxϕτj+∆τj+1.
Given our deﬁnition of ∆τj ≡ τj+1 − τj − 1, this might seem to imply that xtL = − κ
λxϕτj+1, or
that agents are aware of a coming change in regime before its realization. The solution to this
apparent inconsistency is that τj+1 is actually still a random variable from the perspective of time
tL. In other words, the public realizes that tL = τj + ∆τj was indeed the last period of the jth
regime only ex post, after having observed ηtL+1 =1 . This is in turn reﬂected in the fact that,
given our timing assumption on the multipliers, ϕτj+∆τj+1 is predetermined as of time tL (i.e.
measurable with respect to ItL information), so that in fact ϕτj+∆τj+1 6= ϕτj+1 =0and xtL does
not contain any information on the coming reoptimization. Moreover, again from equation (17a),
we ﬁnd that ϕt+1 = −λx
κ xt, which suggests that in this simple model the value of relaxing the
forward looking constraint is proportional to the current output gap. This relationship therefore
formalizes the intuition that the temptation to abandon the optimal plan is stronger, the deeper
the recession to which the central bank has committed itself at the time of the shock.
15Now, combining the ﬁrst two equations results in an equilibrium relationship between inﬂation
and the output gap, πt = −λx
κ ∆xt, which can in turn be substituted in (17c) to yield a second
order diﬀerence equation for xt
(1 − α)βEtxt+1 −
µ









with the “ﬁctitious” initial condition xτj−1 =0(Woodford, 1999). Its characteristic polynomial
(1 − α)βµ2 −
µ






has roots µ1 (α) and µ2 (α) inside and outside the unit circle respectively. Moreover, it can easily
be shown that a marginal increase in credibility always decreases both roots, or, more formally,
that
∂µi(α)
∂α > 0, for i =1 ,2 and ∀α ∈ [0,1).15
The solution of equation (18) is then












From this expression we can immediately observe that higher credibility (a lower α), decreasing
µ1, dampens the initial impact of a supply shock on the output gap and makes its decay faster.16
This in turn reﬂects the beneﬁcial eﬀect of credibility on inﬂation expectations, which translates
into a favorable shift of the trade-oﬀ faced by the central bank. Another interesting feature of
this equilibrium is that, by virtue of the quasi commitment assumption, each central banker’s
policy plan is entirely independent from the economic conditions prevailing before date τj.17 This
is reﬂected in the “initial” condition xτj−1 =0 , which is independent of the actual value of
the output gap in period τj − 1. In other words, under quasi commitment, each central banker
is assumed to contemplate her new plan from a τj-optimal perspective, rather than from the
timeless perspective of Woodford (1999) and Svensson and Woodford (2003). Under the timeless
perspective, incoming central bankers would behave as if xτj−1 = xτj−1, which would lead them
to simply continue the plan initiated by their predecessor–who was indeed assumed to have done
the same...–thus eliminating the time inconsistency on which quasi commitment is built. It is
important to note however that quasi commitment solves one of the logical inconsistencies of t0-
commitment, in that there is nothing special here about the times at which plans are reformulated,
15 I nt h ec a s eo fd i s c r e t i o n(α =1 )this solution method is no longer valid, since the inﬁnite sum in (16) collapses
to a single element and the ﬁrst oder conditions in (17) no longer characterize the equilibrium.
16 This statement about the rate of decay is conditional on no reoptimization happening after the initial impulse,
an event whose likelihood is inversely proportional to α. See section (3.2.3) below for more details on this issue.
17 This is true only for the absence of “physical” state variables in our model (the x’s of section 2). In the
presence of such variables we would ﬁnd instead that each central banker’s plan is the same function of the initial
state, a simple restatement of the Bellman principle holding across successive regimes.
16so that it becomes more acceptable that at those times policies would be reoptimized from a
conditional rather than an unconditional perspective (Svensson, 1999b)




1 − (1 − α)βµ1
xt + ut (20)
as a function of the output gap and of the current shock. Even if it is not possible to establish
analytically the eﬀect of a marginal change in α on the equilibrium impact of an ineﬃcient shock
on inﬂation, this expression highlights the three sources of this credibility eﬀect. First, ﬂuctua-
tions in inﬂation are inversely proportional to ﬂuctuations in the (absolute value of the) output
gap. Dampening the latter, credibility actually contributes to amplify the former, on impact.
Second, accelerating the decay of the initial shock–conditional on no reoptimizations– more
credibility leads the public to rationally forecast a faster easing of future inﬂationary pressures,
thus contributing to moderate present inﬂation. This eﬀect is reﬂected in the −βµ1 (α) term in
the denominator of (20). Third, a lower α means that agents, expecting any given regime to last
longer, put more weight on their forecasts of future output gaps when translating them into their
current pricing decisions, which in turn results in higher prices. This eﬀect is reﬂected in the
−(1 − α) term in the denominator of (20).
Finally, recalling the relationship between the current interest rate and the other endogenous
variables given by (13), it is immediate to solve for the sequence of interest rates needed to bring
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Since it is a linear combination of the one step ahead forecasts of inﬂation and the output gap, it
is obvious that if more credibility dampens the impact of shocks on both the equilibrium output
gap and inﬂation, then it will have the same eﬀect on the interest rate paths that implement
that equilibrium. This intuition is conﬁrmed by the preceding expression and by our numerical
experiments below.
With these analytical expressions in hand, it is also possible to compute the value of the
problem as a function of the credibility parameter α. This expression though is too unwieldy to
yield any particular insight and is therefore omitted. We choose instead to visually illustrate some
of the features of the equilibrium resorting to a calibrated version of the model.
3.2.2 Calibration
Our benchmark calibration for the model’s parameters follows Woodford (1999), and is summa-
r i z e di nt h et a b l eb e l o w
σ κ β λx
1.5 0.1 0.99 0.048
The model is assumed to refer to quarterly variables, with interest rates and inﬂation measured as
annualized percentages. All assumed parameter values are reasonably standard, with the possible
17exception of the relative weight on the output gap in the central bank’s loss function. This
extremely low number derives from the microfoundations of the loss as a second order expansion
of the utility function of the representative consumer. It is therefore consistent with the rest of
the structural parameters. However, even if we adopt this value as our benchmark, we also report
results for values of λx more commonly found in the optimal monetary policy literature.
3.2.3 Dynamic Responses to Ineﬃcient Shocks
Types of Impulse Response Functions The quasi commitment model presented in sec-
tion ?? is driven by two diﬀerent types of shocks: structural shocks ε and regime change shocks
η. When describing the dynamic behavior of the economy through impulse response functions,
there are several possibilities that might reasonably be considered depending on what aspects of
the model are under investigation.
Letting zt denote the variable under investigation, there are at least three types of impulse
response functions (IRFs) one can plot in response to an impulse occurring at time t =0 , for any
given value of the credibility parameter α. They are summarized in the table below
Impulse Response Function
i) E0[zt|ηt =0 ∀t>0] − E−1 [zt]
ii) E0[zt|random realization {ηt}t>0] − E−1 [zt]
iii) E0[zt] − E−1 [zt]
The ﬁr s tt y p eo fI R F sa r ew h a tw ec a l l“ w i t h i nr e g ime” responses. They are conditional on no
reoptimization occurring over the horizon of interest and correspond to a traditional response
from the state space form associated with the solution to system (17). Depending on the value
of α, the absence of a reoptimization becomes less and less likely with the length of the horizon,
so that the path of zt is proportionally less representative of the actual position of the system.
The second type of responses is one way to solve this problem. The path following a shock is now
computed conditional on a sequence of reoptimizations (positive realizations of η), drawn from the
distribution of the sequence {ηt}. These IRFs represent one possible realization of the path for
the variable z, whose ex ante probability is indeed very low, but constant over the entire horizon.
Finally, the responses under iii) are simply the ex ante average of all the possible conditional
IRFs, integrated over the distribution of the corresponding reoptimization draws.
In the simple model above for example, noting that with i.i.d. shocks a reoptimization implies
an immediate return to the steady state, analytical expressions for the IRFs of the output gap to
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18Impulse Responses to Independent Shocks With these preliminaries in place we can
now turn to the description of the impulse responses of the simple monetary model presented
in section 3.1 to a unit cost-push shock.18 We assume that the economy starts in steady state,
with zero inﬂation and no output gap. Since these are also the values of the endogenous variables
that maximize the policymaker’s objective function, changes in regime will not move the economy
away from this steady state as long as cost-push shocks are absent.
Figure 1 shows the path of inﬂation, output gap and interest rate under commitment and
discretion. With the benchmark calibration, this just replicates the results in Woodford (1999).
Under discretion the central bank moves its instrument with the shock, returning the economy to
steady state as soon as the eﬀects of the shock have faded. Given an i.i.d. impulse, this implies
that the economy is driven into a sharp recession, accompanied by high inﬂation, but for only
one period. Under commitment instead the central bank exploits the possibility of inﬂuencing
inﬂation expectations in its favor in the period of the shock, by promising a protracted mild
recession, accompanied by deﬂation. This can be accomplished with a very limited movement in
the interest rate, in the absence of intervening shocks to the natural interest rate. This path for
the policy variable is indeed time inconsistent, since the central bank would want to return to
zero inﬂation and output gap as soon as the shock has disappeared. Note that this is also the
policy that a new central banker would choose if allowed to reoptimize in any period following
the period of the shock. In fact, in the absence of new shocks, the steady state values of the
endogenous variables are consistent with an optimal commitment.19
What is the behavior of the economy under quasi commitment? Figure 2 provides part of
the answer, presenting IRFs of type i) under two diﬀerent levels of credibility, associated with an
expected life of the commitment of two quarters and two years respectively. As noted above, this
path for the variables is very unlikely, since it is associated with a string of twenty zero realizations
of the η shock following the cost-push impulse. Nevertheless this experiment is instructive. On the
one hand, we see that the dynamic response of the system is almost indistinguishable from that
under commitment when the average regime duration is α−1 =8 . This suggests that relatively
low levels of credibility are enough to produce qualitative responses of the economy very close to
the ones obtained under commitment. On the other hand, when the expected duration of the
regime is only two quarters, the path of inﬂation is very close to that under commitment, but
this is associated with a high cost in terms of output. The contraction needed to keep inﬂation
close to its optimal level is much higher if the central bank has little credibility. This is the path
that would obtain if, at the time of the shock, a new central banker came into oﬃce, who refused
to validate the private sector’s expectations and did not reoptimize even in the face of a positive
realization of η. Of course, there is no room in our model for this sort of behavior. The optimal
policy under quasi commitment entails a reoptimization whenever η =1 , and the equilibrium is
18 Impulses are normalized to produce an annualized one percentage point increase in inﬂa t i o no ni m p a c t ,f o r
given expectations. Given the forward looking nature of the model, the actual increase in inﬂation is a function of
the forecasted response of policy to the shock.
19 This depends from the fact that there is no average inﬂation bias in our model. The inconsistency of the
optimal plan is thus only conditional on the existence of ineﬃcient shocks.
19constructed under the assumption that this will indeed happen. Nevertheless, we think that it is
not hard to picture this as a crude description of what happened under Federal Reserve chairman
Paul Volker. Inheriting a central bank with a low credibility in ﬁghting inﬂation, faced with
new inﬂationary pressures stemming from the second oil price shock, Volker chose to undergo
the high output costs of a painful disinﬂation, ostensibly in order to establish a higher credibility
for the Fed and thus better outcomes in the face of future shocks. To justify this behavior in a
model where quasi commitment is the source of the lack of credibility, we should model a channel
through which central bankers could convince the public that they are drawing the times of their
reoptimizations from a distribution with a lower α. This is one of the items on our research agenda.
To better characterize the “typical” behavior of the economy under quasi commitment, we
need to take a stance on the occurrence of regime changes following a positive realization of the
cost-push shock. This is done by looking at type ii) IRFs. The case with α−1 =2is depicted
in Figure 3, where the circles mark the times of positive η realizations. As expected, as soon as
it is given the opportunity, the central bank moves the economy back to the optimal path under
discretion, which, conditional on no new shocks hitting the economy, is also the optimal plan from
the perspective of the time of the reoptimization. This is due to the absence of correlation in the
ineﬃcient shock. To see what happens on average, Figure 4 shows IRFs of type iii). The partially
credible central bank generates intermediate dynamics between the discretion and commitment
responses for the ﬁrst few periods after impact, but that quickly converge to the discretion path
after about four quarters.
Impulse Responses to Persistent Shocks Figure 5 shows what would happen if the
system were hit by a persistent shock.20 In this case the diﬀerence in the path of the variables
under discretion and commitment is less pronounced than before, since the persistence in the
shock causes a similar persistence in inﬂation and output gap under discretion. In order to
keep inﬂation close to its optimal path, a central banker that refused to reoptimize under quasi
commitment would now cause a much sharper recession than under independent shocks, due to the
prolonged impact of the shock on the economy and the associated higher inﬂation expectations.
Somewhat stretching our interpretation, if we believe that the ﬁrst oil price shock was expected to
be persistent, while the second was thought to be temporary, this would lead us to conclude that
Chairman Volker chose the optimal time to establish a higher credibility for the Fed.21 Finally, we
can see how a series of reoptimizations, starting with one in period 3, now brings the endogenous
variables back to their discretion paths only gradually. This is also conﬁrmed by Figure 6, which
shows impulse response functions of type iii). The convergence to the discretion path is much
slower than in the uncorrelated case for inﬂation and the output gap, while the path of the policy
instrument is virtually identical to that under discretion after only three quarters.
20 We assume that ut is an AR(1) process with parameter 0.7.
21 It is interesting to note that the Fed did attempt to tighten policy in 1975, following the ﬁrst oil price shock,
but this attempt was quickly abandoned (a reoptimization?...). See for example De Long (1997) for a brief and
suggestive monetary policy history of the sventies.
20Unconditional Moments A very similar picture to the one emerging from the conditional
statements involved in studying impulse response functions also emerges from a look at the un-
conditional second moments of the equilibrium sequences. Figure 7 shows the unconditional
correlations between the endogenous variables, for an economy with i.i.d. shocks. Once again we
see how the ability to commit even for a short number of periods on average has dramatic eﬀects
on the equilibrium behavior of the economy, also contributing to a signiﬁcant reduction in the
volatility of the policy instrument that is required to achieve the desired equilibrium.
3.3 The Gains from Commitment
So far we have shown that our model’s equilibrium dynamics are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by poli-
cymakers’ credibility, and that the continuum of quasi commitment rules bridges the gap between
the commitment and discretion dynamics. Our next step is then to investigate to what extent
credibility inﬂuences the level of welfare attainable under the optimal policy, conditional on the
available commitment technology. Before doing this though, it is probably worth commenting on
the metric that we will adopt for these welfare comparisons. If y∗
t(α) is the vector of equilibrium
values for the arguments of the loss function, we can write the expected loss at the beginning of
the planning horizon as L(α)=E [
P
t u(y∗
t(α))]. Although it is true that any monotonic transfor-
mation of u maintains the same preference ordering, only aﬃne transformations can be consistent
with a given level of the elasticity of substitution. Therefore, for any given calibration, we can
meaningfully interpret the change in welfare associated with diﬀerent levels of credibility as a
fraction of the total diﬀerence in welfare between discretion and commitment. This is the metric
adopted below in our study of the gains from marginal increases in credibility.
Our analysis starts from Figure 8, which shows the eﬀect on the lowest attainable loss of
quarterly increments in the average length of a regime under our benchmark calibration. The
gains from even minimal levels of credibility are very substantial and most of the total gain can
be obtained with an expected duration of the commitment of about three years. More speciﬁcally,
as shown in table 1, under the benchmark calibration an average regime length of six quarters
is enough to produce 75% of the gains from commitment, and 90% of the gains can be obtained
by an average duration of the commitment of three and a half years. This strong conclusion is
robust to changes in the relative weight of output in the welfare function, as visually conﬁrmed by
Figure 10, in which inﬂation and output ﬂuctuations receive the same wight. As shown in Table
1, an average duration of the commitment of nineteen quarters is now required to obtain 75% of
the gains from commitment, but two years are enough to cover half of the gap between discretion
and commitment.
Another instructive way of looking at the signiﬁcant eﬀect of an even limited amount of
commitment is to plot the combinations of output gap and inﬂation volatility associated with the
optimal policy for diﬀerent levels of α. Figure 9 shows an even starker picture than the welfare
comparisons. A commitment expected to last for only two quarters cuts the volatility of inﬂation
by more than one half, with no discernible eﬀect on the volatility of the output gap. An average
21duration of the commitment of one year is enough to move within two basis points of the inﬂation
volatility under commitment, again with no signiﬁcant losses in terms of output stabilization.
Of course, further reductions in the volatility of inﬂation require signiﬁcantly bigger sacriﬁces
in terms of output volatility. In comparison, the volatility frontier in Figure 11 shows a much
smoother transition from discretion to commitment in the case of λx =1 , consistent with the
corresponding results of the welfare ranking.
Finally, to illustrate the eﬀect of credibility across all choices of output weights, Figure 12
displays the eﬃcient frontiers traced out by letting λx vary from our low benchmark value to
inﬁnity, with each line corresponding to a speciﬁc credibility level α. Note that, as λx increases
towards inﬁnity, all the curves converge to (1,0) in sd(π)−sd(x) space, since in this case, regardless
of the level of α, output is completely stabilized and the cost-push shocks feed directly into the
inﬂation rate. What is interesting however is that, quite uniformly across output weights, we
observe substantial welfare gains from marginal increases in credibility at low levels of expected
regime duration.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper introduced the notion of quasi commitment, a policy rule with limited commitment in
which policymakers renege on their announced optimal plans with a constant, exogenous proba-
bility every period. In this framework, commitment and discretion become the two polar cases of
a more general decision making procedure. Assuming that private agents know the probability of
a renegotiation, and form expectations on the future course of policy accordingly, we can interpret
the expected duration of the announced plans as a continuous measure of whether policymakers
match deeds to words. This is the notion of credibility proposed by Blinder (1998). We then
apply our solution method to a calibrated version of a forward looking model of the monetary
transmission mechanism. Our results conﬁrm that, even in the absence of any reason for the cen-
tral bank to induce a bias in the average level of inﬂation, commitment is superior to discretion
in the natural metric of a second order approximation to the utility of the representative agent.
More interestingly, we ﬁnd that most of the gains from commitment accrue at relatively low levels
of credibility. In our benchmark calibration, a commitment expected to last for six quarters is
enough to bridge 75% of the welfare gap between discretion and commitment. We also show that
this result is robust to variations in the welfare weight on output gap ﬂuctuations.
This paper is only a preliminary study of the behavior of a particular model economy under
quasi commitment. The robustness of our results across diﬀerent models of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism is an open question, that warrants further investigation. In fact, progress in
this direction can be accomplished with a relatively modest eﬀort, given that our solution method
has been devised for a general class of DSGE models that admit a log-linear representation as an
expectational VAR system.
Finally, endogenizing the probability of a change in regime seems an obvious step to increase
the empirical plausibility of the model. We could think of two ways of accomplishing this, which
22we see as complementary. On the one hand, we could allow central bankers to invest in their
credibility, for example by refusing to reoptimize when given the option. This would indeed be
justiﬁed only as long as the private sector could learn about the new frequency of reoptimizations.
Comparing the costs of the transition, when inﬂation expectations are higher than what is justiﬁed
by the actual behavior of the central bank, with the long run gains associated with the higher level
of credibility, would produce a normative analysis of the transition from low to high credibility
regimes. On the other hand, and more in the spirit of Flood and Isard (1988), we could assume
that the probability of a reoptimization depends on the state of the economy, for example by
making this probability a function of the vector of predetermined Lagrange multipliers, which
measure the temptation to disregard the associated constraints and reoptimize. Even though
arguably desirable on the grounds of realism, these extensions would come at the cost of foregoing
the linear quadratic structure that provides the model its extreme tractability. For this reason we
think that the quasi commitment framework with exogenous reoptimizations provides a useful ﬁrst
step in the direction of expanding the menu of policy rules besides discretion and commitment.
23A S o m eD e t a i l so ft h eC a l c u l a t i o n s
Below we provide a few additional details of the solution. A fully worked out set of calculations
is available from the authors upon request.
A.1 From the Bellman Equation to the Lagrangian
The recursive formulation of the policymaker’s problem stated regime by regime is given in (6) as

















GEτj+kXτj+k+1 − A21xτj+k − A22Xτj+k − B2iτj+k
´io
s.t.
xτj+k+1 − A11xτj+k − A12Xτj+k − B1iτj+k − ετj+k+1 =0
ϕτj =0
The policymaker calculates the ﬁrst order condition of (21) taking as given private agents’
rational expectation formation
Eτj+k[Xτj+k+1]=( 1− α)Eτj+k[Xτj+k+1|τj+1 >τ j + k +1 ]+αHE τj+k[xτj+k+1] (22)
as well as the form of the value function
V (x)=x0Px+ ρ (23)
The running cost function in (21) involves a random sum since the policymaker is uncertain
about how many periods the current regime will last. Thus she must take into account that the
regime will last for any given number of periods with positive probability. In this context, the
assumed exogeneity of the regime change signals represents a major simpliﬁcation. In particular,
the assumption implies that ∀j : ∆τj ∼Geometric(α), so that Pr{∆τ = m} =( 1− α)mα.
Using the law of iterated expectations we can apply Eτj+k[·|τj = m] to the kth term in (21),




Eτj[β∆τ+1V (xτj+1)|∆τj = m]=βm+1EτjV (xτj+m+1)
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+αGHxτj+m+1 − A21xτj+m − A22Xτj+m − B2iτj+m
¢
+2φ0
τj+m+1(xτj+1+m − A11xτj+m − A12Xτj+m − B1iτj+m)
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A.2 Solving for the Value Function
After solving the ﬁrst order conditions of the Lagrangian (24), one may solve for the value function
parameters (P,ρ) by substituting the state space representation of the equilibrium dynamics
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Note that the matrices V1,V 2 are functions of the state space form {M,C,ξ} alone. Interestingly,
one immediately retrieves the value function of the discretion problem by setting α =1(see for
instance Söderlind, 1999). When α =0instead, the value function reduces to a Sylvester equation
whose solution is the expected discounted sum of period losses conditional on the state space form
holding forever.
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Figure 1: Dynamic responses to a one standard deviation, uncorrelated cost push shock under commitment
and discretion. The fat dotted lines are the discretion responses and the fat dashed lines are the commitment
responses. The weight on output in the loss function is λx =0 .05.
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Figure 2: Dynamic responses to a one standard deviation, uncorrelated cost push shock with NO REOP-
TIMIZATIONS. The fat dotted lines are the discretion responses, the fat dashed lines are the commitment
responses while the thin lines are the quasi commitment responses corresponding to average regime durations
of 2 and 8 periods respectively (i.e. α =0 .5,0.125). The weight on output in the loss function is λx =0 .05.
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Figure 3: Dynamic responses to a one standard deviation, uncorrelated cost push shock with RANDOM
REOPTIMIZATIONS. The fat dotted lines are the discretion responses, the fat dashed lines are the commit-
ment responses while the thin lines are the quasi commitment responses corresponding to an average regime
duration of 2 periods (i.e. α =0 .5). The circles correspond to periods in which reoptimization occurs. The
weight on output in the loss function is λx =0 .05.
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Figure 4: Dynamic responses to a one standard deviation, uncorrelated cost push shock, AVERAGING
OVER REGIME CHANGES. The fat dotted lines are the discretion responses, the fat dashed lines are the
commitment responses while the continuous lines are the average quasi commitment responses corresponding
to an average regime duration of 2 periods (i.e. α =0 .5). The weight on output in the loss function is
λx =0 .05 .
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Figure 5: Dynamic responses to a one standard deviation, serially correlated (ρu =0 .7) cost push shock
with RANDOM REOPTIMIZATIONS. The fat dotted lines are the discretion responses, the fat dashed
lines are the commitment responses while the thin lines are the quasi commitment responses corresponding
to an average regime duration of 2 periods (i.e. α =0 .5). The circles correspond to periods in which
reoptimization occurs. The weight on output in the loss function is λx =0 .05 .
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Figure 6: Dynamic responses to a one standard deviation, serially correlated (ρu =0 .7)c o s tp u s hs h o c k ,
AVERAGING OVER REGIME CHANGES. The fat dotted lines are the discretion responses, the fat dashed
lines are the commitment responses while the continuous lines are the average quasi commitment responses
corresponding to an average regime duration of 2 periods (i.e. α =0 .125). The weight on output in the loss
function is λx =0 .05 .
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Figure 7: The equilibrium behavior of variables under various degrees of commitment. Each“+" cor-
responds to an average regime duration (in quarters). The discretion and limiting commitment cases are
marked by circles. The weight on output in the loss function is λx =0 .05 and the cost push shocks ut are
uncorrelated.













Figure 8: The gains from credibility. Each“+" corresponds to an average regime
duration (in quarters). The limiting cases of discretion and commitment are
marked by circles. The weight on output is λx =0 .05 and the cost push shocks
ut are uncorrelated.

















Figure 9: The eﬃcient frontier as a function of the average credibility. Each“+" cor-
responds to an average regime duration (in quarters). The limiting cases of discretion
and commitment are marked by circles. The weight on output is λx =0 .05 and the
cost push shocks ut are uncorrelated.


















Figure 10: The gains from credibility. Each“+" corresponds to an average regime
duration (in quarters). The limiting cases of discretion and commitment are marked by
circles. The weight on output is λx =1and the cost push shocks ut are uncorrelated..

















Figure 11: The eﬃcient frontier as a function of the average credibility. Each“+"
corresponds to an average regime duration (in quarters). The limiting cases of discre-
tion and commitment are marked by circles. The weight on output is λx =1and the
cost push shocks ut are uncorrelated.

















Figure 12: The eﬃcient frontier as a function of the weight on output in the loss function, λx ∈ [0.04;∞).
Each line corresponds to a diﬀerent average regime duration (and thus a diﬀerent α). The leftmost line cor-
responds to commitment while the rightmost line corresponds to discretion. The lines in between correspond
to (from right to left) average regime durations of 2, 4, 8 and 12 quarters.






































Table 1: The table entries show how many periods the central bank needs to
commit for, on average, in order to achive at least some given percentage of
the total gain from commitment. The numbers in paranthesis are the actual
percentage gains. They diﬀer because only integer (average) commitment lengths
are considered.
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